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On the General Secular Contradiction
Secularization, Chris tian ity, and Po liti cal Theology
A L E X  D U B I L E T
The general omission of Karl Marx from con temporary discussions of po-
liti cal theology is surprising given that “On the Jewish Question” not only 
offers one of the first frontal critiques of the modern state, it does so through 
a resolutely political- theological prism. Significantly, the essay does not cri-
tique a par tic u lar form of the state in order to reconstruct it on some sup-
posedly more legitimate basis. It seeks instead to delineate the presence of 
the theological within the po liti cal form and operations of the state as such. 
Marx does not confuse po liti cal theology with the question of the theo-
logical legitimation of politics, as though theology was merely a name for 
an external surplus; rather, he diagnoses the structural and historical in-
terrelatedness of the two fields and their operations. In his elaboration of 
the essential analogies of theological and po liti cal concepts and operations, 
Marx partakes in po liti cal theology— but he does so by deforming its ac-
cepted coordinates, rejecting at once the liberal statist visions of moder-
nity and any theological or quasi- theological critiques of that modernity 
that emerge from a bolstering of the structures (and strictures) of transcen-
dence, in order to think outside the field structured by this duality across 
its vari ous articulations. It is the danger of the resulting realignment, which 
has the power to redraw the entire problematic as well as the status, mor-
phology, and significance of its central concepts, that renders Marx’s ex-
clusion understandable but also engenders the exigency to challenge it. 
What follows seeks to rectify this genealogical lacuna through an explora-
tion of the transformations entailed by “On the Jewish Question” for po-
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liti cal theology as a discourse—an exploration that  will reassess some of 
the discourse’s foundational conceptual contours, including the significance 
of immanence and transcendence, the relation of Chris tian ity to the secu-
lar state, and the link between mediation and sovereignty. Resisting the 
per sis tent counterposing of the Christian to the secular, it  will instead re-
orient po liti cal theology around the drive for delegitimation and the abo-
lition of the order of the world.
From certain perspectives, often liberal in inclination, the insights of po-
liti cal theology are reducible to the cunning deployments of theological 
supplements within the po liti cal, as in, for example, the state appealing to 
transcendent authority for its legitimation, sanctification, or grounding.1 
To follow such a definition would, in turn, imply the critical necessity of 
displacing or exiting po liti cal theology by freeing the po liti cal from its con-
tamination by religion and theology. The theological supplement would 
be merely a foreign ele ment to be subtracted—or overcome with time—in 
order to perfect the freedom of the po liti cal.  Were the question as  simple 
as that,  were it a question of a supplement, a transcendent theological le-
gitimation, then Bruno Bauer, the target of Marx’s critique, would be right: 
all that would be required to perfect the state would be to  free it from its 
theological sanctifications. In fact, however, it is precisely at the moment 
of such subtraction that the power of the political- theological critique be-
comes truly necessary and operative.
Exiting from po liti cal theology is not nearly so easy to accomplish, 
 because the logic of po liti cal theology— formulated by Carl Schmitt and 
 earlier (and with a distinctly diff er ent aim) by Marx—is not that of the 
supplement but that of structural systematic analogy and historical trans-
fer. The import of po liti cal theology lies in the diagnosis of a theological 
grammar operating at the heart of the secular state and of a more general 
transference of theological concepts into po liti cal ones.2 It is not a ques-
tion of use or of legitimation, as much as of the secularized per sis tence of 
theological concepts and operations within the putatively secular state. 
Hence Schmitt’s famous dictum: “All significant concepts of the modern 
theory of the state are secularized theological concepts not only  because 
of their historical development . . .  but also  because of their systematic 
structure.”3 Or, one might call to mind Jan Assmann’s broader definition of 
po liti cal theology as encompassing not merely the secularization of theo-
logical concepts, but the more complex set of movements of secularization 
and theologization that inflect most of the fundamental concepts of West-
ern modernity.4  Either way, the theological ele ment is not external to the 
po liti cal, but internal to its operation of power. It marks not its contingent 
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failure or incompletion, but the nature of its operation according to its 
concept and, as such, cannot be purified through subtraction or evolution. 
In other words, po liti cal theology is impor tant as a problematic and a 
discourse not  because it legitimates power transcendently, thereby neces-
sitating secular critique— allowing for the self- satisfied restaging of En-
lightenment’s critique of religion— but precisely  because it undercuts the 
triumphalist narrative of secularized modernity, disallowing its desires to 
dissociate and wash its hands of Chris tian ity and enter into a world of sec-
ular self- legitimation.5
This is at the heart of Marx’s response to Bauer’s critique of the limita-
tions inherent to the so- called Christian state, which for Marx is precisely 
“the imperfect state and Chris tian ity serves as supplement and sanctification 
of this imperfection.” 6 The critical task that Marx bequeaths is more com-
plicated than simply the affirmation of a secular politics of the modern state 
against its theological distortions. Hence Marx’s dialectical formula: “The 
perfected Christian state is not the so- called Christian state which recog-
nizes Chris tian ity as its foundation, as the state religion, and which there-
fore excludes other religions. The perfected Christian state is rather the 
atheist state, the demo cratic state, the state which relegates religion to the 
level of other ele ments of civil society” (222). In other words, it is the state 
as such, one that is no longer grounded through a theological supplement, 
that is the ultimately Christian one, in the sense that it fundamentally op-
erates, as I  will show shortly, according to the diremptive logic of Chris-
tian ity. The conceptual operations of Chris tian ity are not overcome into 
the neutrality of the state, rather the power of Chris tian ity is exercised in 
and by the secular state when it operates according to its very concept and 
power.7
Exiting from the apparatus of po liti cal theology, according to this di-
agnosis, entails not merely moving beyond theology into the brave new 
world of pure politics, into the secular  human order freed of all illusions, 
but the subversion of the conceptual analogy and transference of opera-
tions that structures and co- imbricates the theological and the po liti cal. 
The fundamental question is neither a theological legitimation of politics 
nor the formation of purely secular po liti cal realm, but the critical tracing 
of a complex morphology and the interleafing exchange of concepts that 
prevents theology and secular thought from being separated out into dis-
tinct containers and played off each other. This is the power of Marx’s in-
sistence that “The so- called Christian state is the Christian negation of 
the state, but is certainly not the po liti cal realization of Chris tian ity” (222). 
The po liti cal realization of Chris tian ity, by contrast, is found in the purely 
secular state: Chris tian ity operates as religion as well as the name for the 
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po liti cal form of modernity itself. In his own way, Marx  here prefigures a 
claim articulated recently by Gil Anidjar, that secularism is the name Chris-
tian ity gives itself in modernity, one of the ways “by which Chris tian ity 
forgot and forgave itself” and rendered itself invisible and neutral.8
As has been frequently explored, the critique of the limits of po liti cal 
emancipation— the attainment of the equal rights and equal standing be-
fore the state—is at the heart of Marx’s essay.9 Marx suggest that we ex-
amine po liti cal emancipation critically, since it always and necessarily 
remains merely po liti cal and ideal; but he does so also for another reason. 
Po liti cal emancipation marks also the emancipation of the po liti cal itself— a 
pro cess through which the po liti cal separates itself from and disburdens 
itself of material life, establishing itself as an autonomous realm, coincid-
ing with the state. The state creates its subject- citizens in the very same ges-
ture in which it emancipates itself from the material ele ments that make 
up the life of  those individuals, ele ments that now become permanently 
consigned to civil society. It is rendered an autonomous and pure sphere 
by making every thing  else count as merely “non- political distinctions” of 
civil society (219). The autonomy of the po liti cal and its concentration in 
the state is an act of purification that allows it to stand above the now- 
depoliticized material life, which is not abolished in the pro cess but is in-
stead rendered a presupposition for the state. The result is a universality of 
“the standpoint of the state” (Staatsgesichtspunkt) standing above all the 
spheres of material life that it has relegated to civil society as apo liti cal, of 
merely private concern (219).
This critique of the po liti cal, of its purification and genesis, is revealed 
as a po liti cal-theological critique at the moment when the structure so en-
acted is shown to be a secularization— and a fulfillment—of Chris tian ity. 
The very relation of state to civil society carries a ge ne tic and structural 
analogy within it: “Where the po liti cal state has attained its full degree of 
development man leads a double life, a life in heaven and a life on earth, 
not only in his mind, in his consciousness, but in real ity” (220). As secu-
lar, the state in fact enacts a double life, whose diremption carries a direct 
trace of secularization. The theological grammar of the celestial and the 
terrestrial, “a life in heaven and a life on earth” (220), is secularized and 
materialized into the grammar of the state and civil society. This secular-
ization preserves the form and logic while enacting a displacement of site 
and register, by means of which the theological is divested of the substan-
tive need to justify and defend itself. For Marx, this secularization marks 
not the decline but rather the genuine realization of Chris tian ity, by which 
the theological diremption is rendered into one that actually structures real 
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lived experience. The modern state is the worldly truth of Chris tian ity and 
not its radical overcoming. It materializes a theological transcendence in 
the secular, or as Marx formulates it: “The so- called Christian state needs 
the Christian religion to complete itself as a state. The demo cratic state, 
the true state, does not need religion for its completion. On the contrary, 
it can discard religion [von der Religion abstrahiren]  because in it the  human 
foundation of religion is realized in a secular [weltliche] way” (223).
To say that the secular state realizes Chris tian ity is not to embrace the 
West by taking up secularization as a uniting thread that constitutes it.10 
Rather, it is to insist that it is not enough to affirm secularism to break 
with Chris tian ity, just as, in contrast, it is insufficient to reaffirm Chris-
tian ity to break with secularism. In other words, Marx’s move is to avow 
that the central operation of secular power is not purely secular but, 
through a set of complex transferences and mutations, a secularized 
Christian one: “The final form of the Christian state is one which recog-
nizes itself as state and disregards the religion of its members” (226). The 
modern state is not a break with Chris tian ity, but a transmutation of 
Chris tian ity— its very po liti cal realization— into a purely po liti cal and 
self- declared neutral and impartial space. It is precisely through the pro-
duction of this neutral space, which insofar as it is neutral is also unmarked 
and invisible, that the secular state is, paradoxically, “the practical expres-
sion of [Chris tian ity’s] universal religious significance” (226).
Is  there not, however, something fundamentally mistaken in such a po liti-
cal theological approach to Marx?  After all, Marx’s methodological insis-
tence seems clear enough: “We do no turn secular questions into theological 
questions. We turn theological questions into secular questions” (217). 
Despite appearances, this is hardly a call for a worldly, secular criticism. 
Rather than rendering theology immaterial, what Marx suggests is that 
theological questions in modernity always have to be analyzed within the 
ambit of secular power. We fundamentally  mistake the way secular 
power works if we take “religion” in modernity as offering the appropriate 
or sufficient object of polemic, rather than indicating something that is re-
peatedly produced and reproduced as an object and a prob lem by the 
state, its powers of sovereignty and mediation, its morphological relation 
to the life of civil society. In other words, all theoretical investments in or 
cathexes on religion are cases of mistaken displacement that render invis-
ible the more foundational dialectics of secular state power in which they 
materially participate. “The contradiction in which the adherent of a par-
tic u lar religion finds himself in relation to his citizenship is only one 
aspect of the general secular contradiction between the po liti cal state and 
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civil society” (226). The Jewish question—as other questions of religious 
difference—is produced as a question, as a prob lem, by the dominant 
epistemic regime of secular state power that incessantly engenders a depo-
liticized private sphere of civil society, while seeing it as a prob lem requir-
ing regulation and management.11 To fixate on religion, or religious 
difference, as an obstacle to freedom, as Bauer or con temporary defenders 
of secularism do, is to fall into a fundamental inversion, mistaking an ef-
fect for a cause and failing to grapple with the general secular contradic-
tion. For religion as a distinct object and prob lem is produced and reproduced 
in modernity by the secular state apparatus: being relegated to civil soci-
ety by the state, it is forced to fit into the criteria of the normative category 
of religion entailed by the modern regime of secular power— relegated 
to the private sphere, depoliticized, centered on belief, lodged into the 
interiority of the subject, and so on.12 In insisting that critique remains 
theological when it fails to be posed correctly, Marx was the first to insist 
on the primacy of the secular state as the dominant politico- epistemic 
framework in which religion and religious difference become formulated, 
managed, and reproduced. This is what is entailed in turning theological 
questions into secular ones.
As Marx notes, using the case of the United States, complete po liti cal 
emancipation leads not to the abolition of religion, but to its vigorous flour-
ishing, which occurs as religion is “relegated to the level of private inter-
est” and becomes “a private whim, a caprice” (221–222). Insofar as po liti cal 
emancipation entails the elevation of the state above material life— 
rendering it apo liti cal, something presupposed and to be managed—it 
also produces the modern concept of religion and its lived, materialized 
real ity. Marx was one of the first to arrive at the truth that religion as a 
privatized phenomenon centered on belief is an effect of secular po liti cal 
modernity, one of the byproducts of the formation of the modern state.13 
As such, rather than subscribing to the modern concept of religion, Marx 
should be seen as critically delineating its logic and elaborating a geneal-
ogy of its formation.14 Indeed, turning theological questions into secular 
ones requires inserting them into broader analytics of secular power and 
exploring the ways in which secular power produces religion and allows it 
to flourish— offering it up as a reified target for polemic and critique, while 
dissimulating its own primacy and productivity. This is the power of Marx’s 
insistence to “no longer see religion as the basis but simply as a phenome-
non of secular narrowness” (217).
According to Talal Asad’s definition of secularism as a po liti cal doctrine 
and the secular as an epistemic category that undergirds its assumptions 
and sensibilities,15 not only is Marx not a secular thinker, it is the position 
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of secularism that he fundamentally targets in his polemic with Bauer, who 
poses the conceptual logic of secularism as the ideal horizon. For Bauer, 
the religious opposition between Jews and Christians is a prob lem that is 
to be overcome through recourse to a properly secular state: religious dif-
ference is a material difference that must be overcome into the universal-
ity of citizenship. This proposal is precisely the proj ect of secularism, the 
restructuring of the subject and its allegiances within a nation- state para-
digm. It declares that it is necessary to renounce religion as a special marker, 
as a marker of substantial difference, in order to be emancipated as citi-
zens and members of civil society, of the civil life of the world, and to in-
habit the liberal secular dream of a neutral space. By contrast, Marx’s 
po liti cal theological reflections reject such a secularist distribution of con-
cepts in order to confront Chris tian ity’s mutations through which it per-
sists and is fully realized in the putatively secular life of the state. One might 
say that if theological criticism has to become secular criticism, then secu-
lar criticism has to be apprehended as po liti cal theological criticism, other-
wise it fails to trace the transmuted per sis tence of Chris tian ity in the 
po liti cal form of the state. In other words,  because Chris tian ity spans across 
the theologico- political morphological divide, it cannot be posed as exclu-
sively a theological question, but must be posed as a po liti cal theological 
one— thereby disallowing all narration that would affirm the purified life 
of the secular freed from its links with Chris tian ity.16
Therefore, Marx’s quip that when “the question ceases to be theological, 
Bauer’s criticism ceases to be critical” is hardly a call for a worldly, secular 
criticism (217). This would be to underestimate and misjudge the nature, 
scope, ontology, and operation of secular power. Indeed, the secularist ar-
gument morphologically reenacts the Christian operation that requires 
the conversion of the other  toward a true religion: in both cases a (Jewish) 
remainder is seen as a culprit for unattained and incomplete universality. 
The state proj ect of a universality that abstracts from difference is a muta-
tion and per sis tence of a Christian proj ect, wherein the material difference 
deemed religious is seen as a resistant remainder that must be overcome. 
In this schema, religious difference always doubles as historical difference, 
which, in this case, positions the Jews in par tic u lar as the backward re-
mainder to a universalized history of mankind. In short, secular moder-
nity retains the Christian structure of supersessionism. Indeed, the concrete 
power, per sis tent to this day, of Marx’s question becomes obvious if this 
demand is seen as a broader instigation: “If you [Jews, but also Muslims] 
want to be po liti cally emancipated without emancipating yourselves as 
 humans, the incompleteness and the contradiction lies not in you but in 
the nature and the category of po liti cal emancipation” (226).17
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For Marx, secular power works as a multifaceted apparatus of transcen-
dent mediation generated by the general secular contradiction between civil 
society and the state.18 But this secular contradiction enacts and material-
izes a structure of diremption, of the double life, originally articulated in 
a theological form in Chris tian ity. With this diagnosis, Marx places the 
operation of mediation at the heart of the po liti cal theological problem-
atic. “The state is the mediator [Mittler] between man and man’s freedom. 
Just as Christ is the mediator to whom man attributes all his divinity, all 
his religious bonds, so the state is the mediator to which man transfers all 
his non- divinity, all his  human freedom” (219; trans. modified).  Here, Marx 
is concerned not with the way religion is constituted as a merely private 
affair  under secular power but rather with the way religion— less as a ge-
neric category than as a second name for Chris tian ity— operates as an ap-
paratus of transcendence, diremption, and mediation that is secularized 
and persists in the form of the secular state. Religion in this case names 
not merely what is delimited and lodged within one side of the general sec-
ular contradiction (i.e., within civil society) but rather, in a way, the entire 
diremptive logic under lying the general secular contradiction.
At the heart of mediation for Marx is the exception— not the sovereign 
state of exception that suspends the law as a way to uphold it against the 
perceived threat of antinomian chaos but the exceptional apparatus of sec-
ularized eucharistic mediation. To understand how the exception oper-
ates, it is useful to turn to another of Marx’s judgments: “Man in his 
immediate real ity, in civil society, is a profane being” (220). Despite all its 
apparent immediacy, this figure of man is not a natu ral being but an “il-
lusory phenomenon,” a product of the secularized structure of diremp-
tion. It indicates the materialized terrestrial life severed not only from the 
celestial heavenly life but also from all that is not private, individuated, or 
appropriated, from all that is common, from what Marx terms species 
being. In fact, we might say that if the secular is the entire structure of 
diremption, the immediate real ity, the earthly part of the secular contra-
diction is the profane. But this profane life does participate in the com-
mon life, in the secularized celestial life in the state: for the member of 
civil society, for the bourgeois, as Marx writes, “life in the state is nothing 
more than an appearance or a momentary exception” (220). Marx is  here 
redeploying Bauer’s words, but does so while replacing the subject—it is 
no longer the figure of the Jew, as the remainder to the universal, that 
lives or participates as an exception, but the figure of the bourgeois, the 
generic member of civil society (220). In other words, the exception is po-
liti cal life itself, which temporarily suspends the primacy of private (and 
privative) life, a kind of communion with the communal in excess of the 
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“profane being” that makes up its (illusory, but  actual) existence in civil 
society.
This secularized model of exceptional participation in the celestial com-
munity ultimately upholds life as fundamentally dirempted. “The sover-
eignty of man— but of man as an alien being distinct from  actual man—is 
the fantasy, the dream, the postulate of Chris tian ity, whereas in democ-
racy it is a pre sent and material real ity, a secular maxim” (226). The Chris-
tian dream, along with the apparatus of external mediation that binds the 
earthly and the transcendent aspects of life, is secularized and actualized 
in the structure of modernity. But of course, the sovereignty this excep-
tion generates is a “fictitious sovereignty,” as Marx writes, “divested of his 
real individual life and filled with an unreal universality” (220). So, the 
structure of mediational exception suspends the profane being, but does 
not abolish it, does not dissolve the structure that generates it. Rather, it 
temporarily suspends it only in order to perpetuate what it suspends all 
the more.
Mediational exception justifies itself by posing profane being and the 
state of diremption as natu ral and ineluctable— and then makes them liv-
able, makes them meaningful. It provides an idealistic cadence, a taste of 
secularized heaven, of communal life, but it never challenges the natural-
ization of the unpo liti cal man “der unpolitische Mensch,” the figure of the 
bourgeois, which appears as natu ral only as the result of the constitution 
of civil society as a realm severed from the state (233). More fundamen-
tally, what Marx is diagnosing is a theologico- political apparatus of power 
that perpetuates itself by posing itself as necessary, naturalizing the gen-
eral secular contradiction as an unsurpassable horizon of life itself. The 
function of mediation and the mediator is to stabilize external relations, 
rather than pushing the grammar  toward dissolution. It offers a constrained 
participation, the necessary mechanism for the continual reproduction of 
the dirempted life. We might say that mediation is the modality in which 
transcendence is made livable and is lived.
This exceptional mediation arises not as a result of some anthropologi-
cal givens but insofar as the secular state (the atheistic, demo cratic state in 
Marx’s parlance) produces and maintains in its pure form what it 
presupposes— the existence of civil society and in it the “restricted indi-
vidual, restricted to himself [auf sich beschränkten Individuums]” (229). It 
is not that depoliticized life has absconded from its existential duties (as 
Schmitt might have it), or that it has to be overcome and secured by sov-
ereignty (as in Hobbes), but rather that civil society, “the sphere of egoism 
and of the bellum omnium contra omnes,” is produced as such through a 
depoliticization that arises as the obverse side of the becoming autonomous 
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of the state19— a materialization of the Christian division of the terrestrial 
and the celestial into “the secular division” (220–221).
So, the figure of the bourgeois is hardly a natu ral figure.20 Its structure 
suggests something more. Parallel to Kantorowicz’s thesis on the two bod-
ies of the king, the figure or the bourgeois, despite all appearances, is itself 
not purely a secular figure but a po liti cal theological double: a profane and 
private individual that participates in the celestial species life as an excep-
tion, and only as an exception. That is, if with “the regicide, the gap closes 
between the king’s two bodies,”21 then perhaps a gap opens anew— less 
spectacularly, but no less tenaciously—in the unitary doublet of the egois-
tic individual/citizen.22 The task, Marx’s essay suggests, is not to  mistake this 
structure for freedom, and instead to see in it a secularization of Christian 
life in order to open the path to its abolition.
On this account, the modern secular state marks not the inauguration of 
po liti cal theology of immanence but rather reveals itself as a mechanism 
of transcendent mediation. The significance of this comes to light if we 
recall that in formulating the problematic of po liti cal theology, Schmitt 
diagnosed the nineteenth  century as the moment of the shift into a meta-
physics of immanence, against which his par tic u lar orientation of po liti-
cal theology of the sovereign exception that suspends the law is formulated. 
Schmitt formulates this transition as follows: “To the conception of God 
in the seventeenth and eigh teenth centuries belongs the idea of his tran-
scendence vis- à- vis the world, just as to that period’s philosophy of state 
belongs the notion of the transcendence of the sovereign vis- a- vis the state. 
Every thing in the nineteenth  century was increasingly governed by con-
ceptions of immanence. All the identities that recur in the po liti cal ideas 
and in the state doctrines of the nineteenth  century rest on such concep-
tions of immanence.”23 Marx’s account disturbs this genealogical narra-
tion by demonstrating that what Schmitt  will call immanence is itself a 
transcendent apparatus of mediation.  There has never been immanence, but 
only a polemical conflation of mediation with immanence perpetrated from 
the perspective of sovereign transcendence. Indeed, reading Marx along-
side but against Schmitt, we might say that uncovering the operation of 
the secular state as one of transcendent mediation allows Marx to shed light 
on one half of a single katechonic mechanism, the other side of which is 
the sovereign exception.24 Transcendence as mediation and transcendence 
as sovereignty together form a single mechanism that prevents real imma-
nence from irrupting, an immanence that would not be within the pre-
vailing “order of the world [Weltordnung].”25 What Schmitt, whose position 
begins to appear as a kind of rearguard action, diagnoses as the indecisive 
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hesitancy of a flailing liberalism and its apo liti cal bourgeois subjects, be-
comes, on this account, the internal counterpart to his theory of sovereign 
dictatorial exception. Immediate transcendence might see itself as radically 
distinct from its meditational counterpart, but in relation to real imma-
nence, the two operate as an ensemble.
Po liti cal theology can be used as a way to delegitimate the secular in 
the direction of the Christian, or it can be rejected to uphold the legiti-
macy of the secular— both of  these maneuvers, however, render invisible 
(if not actively dissimulate) the single mechanism that unites Chris tian ity 
and secularism into one theologico- political space.26 In contrast to  these 
prevailing positions, Marx diagnoses an apparatus of diremption, transcen-
dence, and mediation operative in Chris tian ity and, subsequently, materi-
alized and secularized in the operations of the secular state. Mediation 
and transcendence do not belong exclusively on  either side of the polemical 
divide between the Christian and the secular but are rather operative 
across it. Indeed, when Marx calls the existence of religion “a defect,” reli-
gion in this instance should be understood as a name for a mechanism— 
like the state itself—of recognition by means of an intermediary, an 
inhabitation of a specular relation with transcendence (217–218). More-
over, the solution to this so- called defect is not found in the secular state 
(which is why Marx is no secularist), but in the abolition of the very bi-
nary between the secular and the religious, in the abolition of the general 
secular contradiction that constitutes modernity.27 If Marx seeks the abo-
lition of religion, he does so only as part of a more general abolition of 
secular power, the abolition of the order of the world in which the distinc-
tion between the secular and the religious is operative and dominant.28
What we have traced is a po liti cal theological diagnosis that undermines 
secular modernity’s own self- authorizing and self- legitimating conceptual 
operations, without asserting  either theological sources of legitimation and 
authority or sovereign- dictatorial ones. Marx’s essay inaugurates a trajectory 
of thought that critiques the secular modern, by identifying its morphologi-
cal and ge ne tic entanglements with Chris tian ity, disallowing them to claim 
each other as enemies, but without appealing to preexistent traditions—be 
they discursive, religious, or other wise—as levers of critique.29 We are faced 
with the question of what it might mean to challenge the secular frame 
without having recourse to a tradition or stable identity that might some-
how be recovered from the violent impositions of po liti cal modernity. In-
deed, by outlining the po liti cal theology of mediated transcendence, Marx 
asserts a structural analogy neither as a form of legitimation nor as a tragic 
impossibility but as an apparatus requiring delegitimation. For, it is the de-
sire and drive for legitimation—of the modern age, the secular state, or a 
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certain theological imaginary— that remains itself the prob lem. The drive 
to delegitimate the order of the world— along with its katechonic mecha-
nisms of temporal distension, the temporalization and deferral that sustain 
the world across the political- theological domain— suggests a political- 
theological orientation  toward dissolution and abolition rather than  toward 
sovereignty or recovery. At hand is not preservation, recuperation, or recon-
stitution but the end of world and its determinate order. Rather than fear-
ing lawlessness or anomia—as thinkers of order, Schmitt included, have 
always done— what must be challenged is the Christian- secular apparatus 
of the profanation and individuation of life and its ontological declaration 
that  there is nothing but the self- enclosed individual, a position that legiti-
mates, as Schmitt correctly pointed out, all of the punitive and salvific un-
dertakings of theologians and politicians.30
Let me conclude with the conceptual ele ment obviously kept in abey-
ance up to this point:  human emancipation— the full emancipation Marx 
opposes to po liti cal emancipation— which would subvert rather than per-
petuate the alienated, secularized structure of “a double life, a life in heaven 
and a life on earth” (220). For it is full  human emancipation that indexes 
the breakdown of the general secular contradiction and the collapse of 
the order of the world—as opposed to po liti cal emancipation, which is 
“the last form of  human emancipation within the prevailing Weltordnung” 
(221). In Marx’s essay, the immanence that emerges with the collapse of 
the apparatus of mediated transcendence is correlated with the name of 
the  human. But what assures us that what arises at the breakdown of the 
order of the world is the  human, if not the dogmatic kernel of the specific 
secularization thesis that declares that at the end history stands the  human 
in adequation of itself? If emancipation necessitates the dissolution of the 
world and its order, then how does the  human remain, as it does in Marx’s 
discourse, an obvious indexical and name? Perhaps, a genuine disruption 
of the po liti cal theological mechanism of dual transcendence, of media-
tion and sovereignty, might disclose a real immanence that no longer is 
allowed to carry the name of the  human.
Much points  toward the equivalence of immanence and the  human in 
early Marx, and yet,  there is a moment that points, however briefly, in a 
diff er ent direction. For, the necessity  behind the breakdown of the order 
of the world, the delegitimation of the world as it is, arises not only  because 
of the division between the state and the civil society but also  because of an 
excess of dehumanization that occurs as the result of that structure. If, as 
Marx notes, “the rights of man” are nothing but  those of civil society,  there 
still remains the question of what is excluded even from this figure of “the 
restricted individual.” The question of the  human and po liti cal theology 
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begins to be altered when we note that the figure of the proletariat emerges 
in the same issue of the Deutsch- Französische Jahrbücher, in the final pas-
sages of Marx’s “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.” 
 There, it is presented as “a class of civil society which is not a class of civil 
society, a class which is the dissolution of all classes”— and, more funda-
mentally, “the total loss of humanity.” This an immanent dissolution since 
it arises not from an ideal or a norm, but immediately from the truth of 
being: “When the proletariat proclaims the dissolution of the existing world 
order, it is only declaring the secret of its own existence, for it is the  actual 
[faktische] dissolution of that order.” The question is, then, if it is indeed a 
total loss of the world, its order, and the state- civil society divide that struc-
tures it, then on what grounds can that name, the name of the  human, be 
retained?  There is a movement from dehumanization that renders the 
 human a profane being, to a further, total dehumanization of the wretched 
being. The split between the profane and the celestial is  here complicated 
by this irrecuperable third. And if the secular is the worldly, then what un-
dermines its coherence also might have to lie outside of the grammar of 
the  human, which it has incessantly produced and reproduced. Yet Marx 
closes this trajectory as soon as he opens it, for the total loss of humanity 
is reinscribed into the normative horizon of the  human: total loss leads to 
“the total redemption of humanity” and even more, it marks the proper open-
ing onto the  human,  because this figure “can no longer lay claim to a his-
torical title, but merely to a  human one” (256). In light of the incorporation 
of the proletariat over the course of subsequent history into the fibers of 
civil society, a pro cess that shows that one cannot retain the  human while 
affirming total loss and deracination, it may be necessary to reopen the 
question of a radical immanence without the  human. What would it mean 
to affirm the abolition of the prevailing order of the world from the per-
spective of that which is without tradition, from the position that does 
not belong except by and for delegitimation?
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Mahmood does, that Marx carries a “conception of religion as distorted belief.” 
Religious Difference in a Secular Age: A Minority Report (Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton 
This content downloaded from 75.69.47.32 on Sun, 14 Feb 2021 19:50:38 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
254 ■ Alex Dubilet
University Press, 2015), 15. On the one hand, Marx offers a critical analy sis  
of the modern concept of religion as it is imbricated in the general secular 
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17. For a complex analy sis in which the position of the Muslim is produced 
as a prob lem by secular power in the con temporary moment, see Mayanthi L.
Fernando, The Republic Unsettled: Muslim French and the Contradictions of 
Secularism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014). Fernando’s book 
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CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 97–113.
25. That Marx speaks of the order of the world is rendered invisible in the 
En glish rendering of Weltordnung as “scheme of  things” (221).
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of the order of the world. Marx’s analy sis  here is another argument against 
understanding him as a radical secularist: for Marx, the task is neither for the 
state to manage religion as something privatized, nor for the state to abolish it 
by force. Rather, the task is the subversion of the entire foundational secular 
division between the state and civil society.
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line of thought, see Talal Asad, “The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam,” Qui 
Parle 17, no. 2 (2000): 1–30; and Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic 
Revival and the Feminist Subject (Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton University Press, 
2005), 113–117.
30. See Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Po liti cal, trans. George Schwab 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996), 64–65.
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